Undemocratic Activism? Transnational Civil Society, the World Bank, and the Democratization of Global Governance

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1 Undemocratic Activism? Transnational Civil Society, the World Bank, and the Democratization of Global Governance Christopher L. Pallas Assistant Professor of Conflict Management Kennesaw State University

2 Presentation Overview Background and significance: What are TCSOs and why are they important? Previous Research: What we know and do not know about the influence of civil society on global governance Civil Society and World Bank: New data and findings Reforming civil society s representation of stakeholders 2

3 Background: Transnational Civil Society Organizations Transnational Civil Society Organizations (TCSOs) o Non-governmental, not-for-profit actors either (a) operating across state boundaries or (b) connected to boundary-spanning networks of CSOs. o Consists of professional NGOs, voluntary organizations, faith groups, and social movements o Examples: Amnesty International; Greenpeace; Oxfam; Arun Concerned Group; Center for Supporting Community Development Initiatives (Hanoi); Aga Khan Foundation; Occupy movement 3

4 The Importance of TCSOs Facilitate direct citizen input Aggregate citizen voices for increased impact Empirical evidence of TCSO impacts on transnational policymaking and the behavior of international actors (states, IOs, MNCs) TCSOs perceived to challenge state power via promulgation and enforcing of norms 4

5 The Democratic Deficit in Global Governance International organizations are generally undemocratic o Decision-making processes often dominated by powerful Northern actors (e.g. UN Security Council, World Bank and IMF board structures) o Decision-making is non-transparent o Organizations/leaders have limited accountability Stakeholder input intermediated by states which may or may not represent citizen interests accurately Transnational policies perceived to benefit Northern interests at the expense of developing countries (e.g. structural adjustment, TRIPS, lack of action on agricultural subsidies, currency liberalization, emissions caps) 5

6 TCS to the Rescue? Conventional wisdom: o TCSOs act to represent grassroots stakeholders o Speak on behalf of marginalized stakeholders o Monitor the behavior of other actors o Hold international policymakers accountable through normative pressure, reforming global governance Problems: o TCSOs largely based in the global North o Questions about TCSO representivity and responsiveness o Most democratizing claims either: Normative/predictive (what TCSOs can/will do) Rely on non-neutral data (practitioner accounts) 6

8 What We Know What we can demonstrate empirically: o TCSOs have power: policymakers and TCSO leaders credit TCSOs with policy impacts o TCSOs monitor actor behavior and promote transparency o TCSOs name and shame, promoting norms What is claimed (but not proven) in the literature: o TCSO power results from norm formation and public pressure o TCSOs act on behalf of marginalized populations o The result of TCSO-driven accountability and transparency is more democratic global governance 8

9 What We Don t Know Who do TCSOs represent? How do TCSOs achieve influence? o Does correlation between norm promotion and change reflect causation? o What is the role of the state? Do TCSOs democratize global governance? 9

11 Democracy as Conceptual Framework Democracy has input, throughput, output components o Input: Participation, inclusion, representation o Throughput: Accountability, transparency o Output: Citizen control; majority rule Majoritarian democracy rests on: o Equality and inclusion of all citizens/stakeholders (even if via designated representative) one person, one vote o Citizen control over governance outputs Focus on representation and citizen control 11

12 Research Questions 1. Who do TCSOs represent? How do they impact equality of representation? 2. How do TCSOs achieve influence? 3. Do TCSOs democratize global governance? 12

13 Methodology: An Origins Forward Approach to Advocacy Research Previous approaches: o Focus on successful cases o Working from victory backwards New approach: o Work from campaign initiation forward o Include organizations that quit or are unsuccessful o Trace the steps in the advocacy process 13

14 Data and Analysis Data: o Qualitative case studies o IDA-10 o Arun III Dam o Use of Country Systems for Procurement Methods: archival research and document/media analysis, interviews, participant observation Hypothesis generation and testing 14

15 Who Do TCSOs Represent? Values and Representation TCSOs set agendas on the basis of preexisting mission or ideals (cf. Pallas, Gethings, and Harris 2015) Representation is not a core ideal for many TCSOs o Representation is matchmaking, not responsiveness o The boomerang can be inverted (Pallas Forthcoming) 15

16 Who Do TCSOs Represent? Role of Resource Constraints Shared agenda between TCSOs and grassroots does not necessarily result in advocacy o TCSOs are resource constrained; advocacy is costly o TCSOs are most likely to undertake advocacy if advocacy on a given issue is funded or they are expect a financial reward Paid by members or donors (e.g. Charles Stewart Mott Foundation) Defending or seeking budget or member support o Choice of targets reflective of cost/benefit analysis not (only) target culpability (Pallas, Fletcher, and Han 2015) 16

17 How Do TCSOs Achieve Influence? Norms and Levers Question: If TCSOs are not representing massive public opinion or marginalized populations, how do they achieve influence? Norm promotion and public advocacy correlates with policy change in many established cases. However: o Confounding variable: Other forms of leverage are used alongside norms. Which levers are most effective? o States retain significant control over many IOs. What is the role of the state? 17

18 How Do TCSOs Achieve Influence? The Enduring Power of the State For TCSOs and the World Bank o Effective power comes primarily via state allies o State power exercised via financial leverage Recruiting state power o State power only accessible to CSOs with appropriate connections and domestic political influence o Connected CSOs engage in gatekeeping to exclude dissenting CSO voices o Consequence: outcomes disproportionately reflect views of politically connected CSOs from powerful states 18

19 Summary: Representation and Influence Representation? o Some groups surely represented but o Choice of cause determined by internal standards o Decision to campaign financially influenced o Choice of target financially influenced Influence? o Largely exercised via states o Powerful/wealthy states most important 19

20 Do TCSOs Democratize Global Governance or Worse Existing Imbalances? In global governance: o TCSOs enhance stakeholder control over outputs, but o No evidence that TCSOs improve equality of voice or inclusivity o Some evidence that TCSOs further imbalance policymaking in favor of Northern populations o Imbalances rooted in systemic factors, not just lack of grassroots consultation or accountability among TCSOs Systemic issues: o Funding creates constraints and establishes incentives o If funding is scarce, why collaborate? o If influence can be achieved alone or in small groups, why invite broader input? 20

22 Improving Democratic Representation Needed reforms: o Improving equality of input among stakeholder populations o Verifying representative claims and encouraging direct accountability between representatives and their claimed stakeholder populations. Systemic solutions are possible. External conditions are significant drivers of behavior TCSOs respond to market stimuli 22

23 Improving Democratic Representation (2) At the World Bank and other IOs o Recognize that TCSO claims of representation need to be demonstrated via some evidence beyond consultations, e.g. a broad, voting membership or funding base o Construct dialogues such that stakeholder populations have roughly equal representation o Require TCSOs requesting participation to demonstrate representation of a stakeholder population For TCSOs o Embrace norms of representivity If this is possible - new research underway o Pool resources under neutral administrator to fund participation by CSOs from LDCs. Use demonstrated representivity as core criteria for funding decisions 23

24 Additional Resources Pallas, C., K. Fletcher, and B. Han (2015) Why Do Activists Lobby Institutions that Have Already Reformed? Modeling Target Selection and Learning in NGO Advocacy, Journal of International Relations and Development. Available online; print version in press. Pallas, C., D. Gethings, and M. Harris (2015) Do the Right Thing: The Impact of INGO Legitimacy Standards on Stakeholder Input, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 26(4), Pallas, C. and A. Uhlin (2014) Civil Society Influence on International Organizations: Theorizing the State Channel, Journal of Civil Society 10(2), Pallas, C. and J. Urpelainen (2013) Mission and Interests: The Strategic Formation and Function of North-South NGO Campaigns, Global Governance 19(3), Pallas, C. (2012) Identity, Individualism, and Activism beyond the State: Examining the Impacts of Global Citizenship, Global Society 26(2), Pallas, C. (2010) Revolutionary, Advocate, Agent, or Authority: Context-based Assessment of Democratic Legitimacy in Transnational Civil Society, Ethics and Global Politics 3(3), Pallas, C. (2010) Good Morals or Good Business? NGO Advocacy and the World Bank s 10th IDA. In A. Uhlin and E. Erman, eds., Legitimacy Beyond the State? Re-examining the Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan. Pallas, C. and J. Wood (2009) The World Bank s Adoption of Country Systems for Procurement: A Good Idea Gone Bad? Development Policy Review 27(2), Pallas, C. (2005) Canterbury to Cameroon: A New Partnership between Faiths and the World Bank, Development in Practice 15(5),